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1 Introduction
In many economic theory and policy contexts, we are accustomed to thinking of national
governments as competing with tax and subsidy instruments to attract the production plants
of “foreign” firms whose profits flow abroad. This assumption might be reasonable, for
example, in the case of competition between European states for the investments of Japanese
multinational enterprises (MNEs). However, in many cases (e.g., competition between EU
member countries for the investments of European MNEs), substantial portions of the firms
concerned are owned within the potential host countries themselves.
Increasing plant mobility has helped to undermine the traditional characterisation of
tax/subsidy competition given above: national governments must now face the possibility
that domestic firms will move production abroad if it is profitable to do so. Moreover, the
globalisation of corporate ownership has made untenable the traditional assumption that
firms labelled “foreign” due to their historical origins or the location of their headquarters
will be entirely owned abroad. For example, the current significant scale of cross-border
share ownership is illustrated in a recent study by the Federation of European Securities
Exchanges (FESE, 2007): at the end of 2005, foreign investors accounted on average for one
third of the value of European equities markets.
These observations on plant mobility and the globalisation of corporate ownership mean
that the countries competing in fiscal inducements to attract mobile production plants fre-
quently own substantial shares in the firms concerned. In such cases, benevolent governments
will care about how tax/subsidy competition affects the profit income accruing to their own
citizens. We examine the implications of this concern for both equilibrium tax/subsidy offers
and plant locations, and we ask how a government’s strategy to attract investment should
change with the international distribution of the firm’s ownership. The strong conclusion
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that we reach is that the strategy should be entirely independent of who owns the firm.
To illustrate some of the empirical issues involved, Table 1 below reports investment
subsidies that the European Commission approved in the EU car industry over 2001-2004.
The first point to note is that these subsidies generally appear large as a proportion of to-
tal investment, perhaps large enough to overturn the effects of corporate taxation on the
projects concerned. This underlines the importance for countries of getting their corporate
tax/subsidy policies right. Two further observations from the table challenge the traditional
characterisation of tax/subsidy competition, which sees the target firms as being “foreign”.
First, national governments appear to pay subsidies to both domestic and foreign car compa-
nies. Thus, the UK government gave subsidies to firms based in several countries: Japanese
Nissan, French Peugeot-Citroen as well as (ostensibly) British Vauxhall.1 Second, it is not
the case that car firms receive higher subsidies abroad than they do in their home markets:
the notionally German Volkswagen, for example, received a larger investment subsidy from
Germany than from Spain. This means that the traditional characterisation of tax/subsidy
competition as a contest for foreign firms is not even approximately correct.
It seems natural to expect that if the bidding countries own shares in the mobile firm,
their setting of corporate taxes/subsidies will reflect a preference on the part of domestic
capital owners for production to be located where operating profits are maximized. This
intuition is, however, misleading. We show that the unique equilibrium of a tax/subsidy
competition game between two governments to attract the plant of a firm is independent of
how the firm’s ownership is distributed internationally. This “Invariance Result” applies both
to the equilibrium location of the firm’s plant and to the countries’ equilibrium tax/subsidy
1 Indeed, it is unclear to what degree Vauxhall is British, being a subsidiary of General Motors. Given this
lack of clarity about the nationality of firms, the question of whether ownership matters for policy becomes all
the more important because, if it does, governments would need to invest in gathering the relevant ownership
data.
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Table 1: Approved investment subsidies to car manufacturers in EU member
states (2001-2004)
State aid Aid inten-
Company Host country (million €a) sity (%)b
Nissan U.K. 60 18.6
Volkswagen Germany 75 12.3
Daimler Chrysler Germany 57 30.9
Renault Spain 18 14.3
Vauxhall U.K. 15 6.4
BMW Germany 363 30.1
BMW Austria 16 15.3
Volkswagen Spain 20 6.4
Peugeot Citroen U.K. 30 9.8
a 1 British Pound is converted to 1.5 €
b Present value of state aid divided by present value of investment
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, C and L (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)
offers. Strikingly, it means that the nationality of the firm is irrelevant to the strategy that
a potential host country should follow in offering investment incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set up a model
that focuses on the competition between two potential host countries for the plant of a
monopoly firm. Our theoretical framework is deliberately simple with minimal structure in
order to highlight the drivers of government/firm choices as clearly as possible. At the same
time, however, our analysis is consistent with a very wide range of government motivations in
tax/subsidy competition—for example, the employment/wage gains from inward foreign direct
investment (FDI), technological spillovers to indigenous firms, tax revenue, profit income to
capital owners, and consumer surplus.
In section 3, we establish what effect the international distribution of the MNE’s own-
ership has on the equilibrium tax/subsidy offers made to the firm and its equilibrium plant
location. We take the international distribution of the firm’s ownership as exogenous, placing
no restrictions as to how it is divided between the two bidding countries and the rest of the
world. Given this, we derive our Invariance Result which shows that, under tax/subsidy
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competition, both the equilibrium plant location and tax/subsidy offers are independent of
the international distribution of firm ownership.
In the conclusion, we present two important implications of our Invariance Result.
2 A Model of Tax Competition
We model the tax/subsidy competition between two host countries for the production plant
of a monopoly firm. We want to investigate how the international distribution of the firm’s
ownership affects the countries’ equilibrium tax/subsidy offers and the plant’s equilibrium
location. For this purpose, we partition the world into a region, which contains the potential
host countries A and B, and the rest of the world (RoW). If the MNE wishes to serve
consumers in the region, it must invest in either A or B as we assume that trade costs
between the region and RoW are prohibitive. In contrast, we make no specific assumptions
(in terms of either levels or symmetry) about intra-regional trade costs between A and B. For
simplicity and in line with much of the existing literature, we rule out two-plant entry, where
the firm sets up plants in both countries. However, as with Haufler and Wooton (1999), it
would be straightforward to introduce explicitly into our analysis a plant fixed cost F that
is sufficiently large to rule out the choice of two plants in equilibrium.
Tax/subsidy competition is represented by a three-stage game of complete information.
In stage one, countries A and B simultaneously and irreversibly post bids BA and BB,
respectively, which can be either taxes (< 0) or subsidies (> 0) and act as location-specific
fixed costs. In stage two, the monopolist decides where to locate its plant, choosing between
production in country A or country B or opting for ∅, where ∅ represents choosing not
to invest in the region (and thereby not serving the regional market). Finally, the product
markets in A and B are served in stage three. We solve the game backwards to isolate its
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
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2.1 Profits of the Firm
We denote by Πj the firm’s pre-tax profits on its operations within the region when its
plant is located in country j ∈ {A,B}. If, for example, the firm chooses A, then it serves
consumers in market A with local production and those in market B with exports. The Πj
term comprises variable profits, earned on the basis of monopoly pricing in both countries,
and any plant-specific fixed cost. However, as with trade costs, we place no restrictions on
the firm’s production costs in the two countries.
If the firm’s cost structures are identical in A and B and if intra-regional trade is costless,
then ΠA = ΠB. If trade is costly, this equality will not generally hold unless the countries’
demand sides are also identical. Thus, for example, with identical cost structures and costly
trade, we would have ΠA > ΠB if A’s market were larger than that of B. In order to avoid
an extensive and unrewarding taxonomy, we assume
ΠA ≥ ΠB ≥ 0 (1)
There are two elements to this assumption. The first (ΠA,ΠB ≥ 0) is that the firm would
find it profitable to set up in either country under laissez faire (BA = BB = 0). Thus,
while the countries may choose to offer subsidies (BA, BB > 0) in order to attract the
MNE’s investment, these are not required to make local production profitable in absolute
terms. Such subsidies would merely alter the relative profitability of alternative locations.
Of course, the host countries may seek to tax the MNE’s investment. We assume that such
corporate taxes (represented by BA, BB < 0) are source-based and that no double taxation
of dividend income occurs in the capital owner’s country of residence.2
The second element of assumption (1) is that country A is, for whatever reason, the more
profitable country in which to invest: ΠA ≥ ΠB.This is innocuous and can be interpreted as
2 See Keen (1993) for an empirical defence of the assumption of source-based coprate taxes.
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Figure 1: The Firm’s Location Choice
a convention on how we label the host countries. Thus, in the absence of any inducements
from the competing governments, the MNE will choose A over B. Let Γ = ΠA − ΠB ≥ 0,
the international profit differential, be called country A’s geographic advantage.
The firm chooses its location and prices to maximize post-tax profits, which constitute
the aggregate income accruing to owners of capital.3 Post-tax profits Π∗j are given by
Π∗j =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Πj +Bj if j = A,B
0 if j = ∅
where j ∈ {A,B,∅} represents the firm’s location choice.Figure 1 illustrates the firm’s
location choice when faced with different offers from the competing, potential-host nations.
The bid space is divided into 3 regions. Region ∅ corresponds to the case where both
3 It might be argued that a firm should maximize the utility of owners, rather than their income. When a
firm has market power, these two do not necessarily coincide. Since profit maximization is simpler to analyse
(it avoids the need to specify utility functions for owners), one could assume that capital owners’ preferences
are such that they choose not to consume the good in question.
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countries set such high taxes on the MNE that its after-tax profits would be negative in
both A and B, and it chooses not to invest (and receives zero profits). If BA ≥ −ΠA
and BB ≥ −ΠB, then the firm chooses between investing in A and B, both of which offer
positive post-tax profits. In the absence of offers from either government (BA = BB = 0),
A’s geographic advantage means that the firm will invest there. Otherwise, if B’s financial
inducement BB is sufficiently large to offset A’s combined geographic advantage and its own
offer BA, then the firm will invest in B. Thus, B wins the competition if BB − BA > Γ.
Clearly, the MNE will be indifferent between locations A and B when post-tax profits are
equalised, Π∗A = Π
∗
B, that is,
Γ+BA −BB = 0. (2)
2.2 Governments and Welfare
We assume that the governments of countries A and B are benevolent, being motivated
by national social welfare, and that they set their taxes/subsidies independently. The gov-
ernments must balance their budgets and their only function is to redistribute income in a
lump-sum manner between their citizens and the firm’s owners. We further assume that the
governments do not discriminate between domestic and foreign capital owners—for example,
by imposing a withholding tax on outward profit flows.4
Corporate taxes in our model take the form of location-specific fixed costs, rather than
proportional profits taxes. There are two justifications for this modelling choice. First, in
reality, proportional profits taxes are typically set for the whole economy, rather than for
specific industries. Our operating profit terms, ΠA and ΠB, could be assumed to capture all
economy-wide tax influences, which are exogenous to the particular industry in our model.
4 In appendix 2, we extend our model to incorporate withholding taxes on the outward profit flows that
accrue to foreign capital owners. We highlight circumstances where our central Invariance Result continues
to hold.
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Second, we will show that corporate subsidies typically arise in our equilibrium and it seems
natural to regard these as lump-sum—for example, as either direct cash payments to firms or
the public provision of infrastructure at the plant.
We assume that the social welfare of country i when the firm chooses plant location j
takes the following form:
Wij =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
eiΠ∗j −Bi + Sij if i = j
eiΠ∗j + Sij if i 6= j
(3)
where i ∈ {A,B} and j ∈ {A,B,∅}. The first term of (3) measures the income of capital
owners in country i from the profits of the MNE, where ei is the share of after-tax profits that
are remitted to residents of country i. Bi measures the cost to host country i of its subsidy
payments to the firm, paid only when the country is succesful in attracting the investment
of the MNE. The final welfare term, Sij , captures all other components of national social
welfare.
The welfare function in (3) is intuitively appealing and, as we show in Appendix 1, it can
be formally microfounded by invoking the widespread assumption of quasi-linear preferences.
In these circumstances, Sij would constitute consumer surplus arising for citizens of country
i when the firm locates in country j.
2.3 The Social Benefits of Investment
For the sake of brevity, we focus on the following case, which appears to be the most empir-
ically relevant, in solving the game:
Sii ≥ Sij ≥ Si∅ for all i, j ∈ {A,B} , i 6= j (4)
We are making two assumptions in (4). The first (Sij ≥ Si∅) is that social benefits are
created whenever the market is served, even if only by imports from the other country in
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the region. This reflects the notion that countries derive benefits (e.g., in terms of increased
consumer surplus) whenever the product market is served, compared to the good being
unavailable in the marketplace. Thus, even if the production takes place in another country,
there are consumption benefits arising from importing the good. The second assumption in
(4) is that local production of the good yields higher social benefits than imports (Sii ≥ Sij).
This reflects what seems to be a widely-held government view. There are many possible
reasons why, independently of capital income and tax/subsidy payments, host countries
may favour local production, and our model’s generality means that it is consistent with
all of them. For example, there may be labour market benefits from inward FDI. MNEs
may offer wage premia above workers’ outside options, a polar case of which occurs when
inward FDI relieves involuntary unemployment (Haaparanta, 1996 and Bjorvatn and Eckel,
2006). Alternatively, inward FDI may be associated with localized technological spillovers
to indigenous firms (Fumagalli, 2003 and Olsen and Osmundsen, 2003). Finally, in the case
where trade between A and B is costly, the market price will be lower, and consumer surplus
higher, under local production, and benevolent governments will recognise this (Haufler and
Wooton, 1999).
Of course, one can envisage factors that would tend to push Sij above Sii (i 6= j). Were
there, for example, environmental pollution localized around the plant or if the other country
offered lower variable production costs then this would favor foreign over local production.
However, the fact that governments frequently offer inducements to inward FDI in practice
suggests that such apparently perverse effects are, in general, not sufficiently strong as to
overturn the ranking in (4).
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3 The Role of Ownership
We assume that the firm’s ownership is distributed internationally in arbitrary proportions
between A, B and RoW and that the firm’s post-tax profits are distributed internationally
to its owners according to their ownership shares. Let equity shares eA and eB measure
the proportions of the firm owned in countries A and B, respectively. We take eA, eB to
be exogenous, and they must satisfy eA, eB ≥ 0 and eA + eB ≤ 1, where 1 − eA − eB is
the share of the firm owned in RoW. We now proceed to determine how the international
pattern of firm ownership affects the offers made to the firm to induce it to invest and the
firm’s consequent choice of location in equilibrium.
In Figure 1, RA and RB are the countries’ best response functions in bid space. Since
the two countries’ decision problems are qualitatively identical, we focus for concreteness on
the actions of country A, which owns a share eA of the firm. It is clear that if A chooses to
set a bid that attracts the firm, it will always set the lowest possible such bid. Therefore,
RA will never lie above the lower boundary of the A region in Figure 1.
If BB < −ΠB, so that the firm prefers ∅ to B, then country A when setting BA effectively
chooses between plant locations A and ∅ . Under our assumptions (1) and (4), it is clear
that country A will choose to attract the firm with a bid of (just above) −ΠA in this case.
Local production generates both tax revenue and wider social benefits for A over the ∅
outcome, while the firm’s post-tax profits are pushed down to zero. Therefore, RA lies along
the horizontal bottom border of the A region in Figure 1.
If BB ≥ −ΠB, then the firm locates in either A or B as locating in B dominates ∅. If it
hosts the firm, country A’s social welfare is
WAA = eA (ΠA +BA)−BA + SAA,
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while A’s welfare if B hosts the firm is
WAB = eA (ΠB +BB) + SAB.
Consequently, A’s welfare gain from local production compared to importing is
WAA −WAB = eA (Γ+BA −BB)−BA + SAA − SAB (5)
This welfare change is just the sum of the changes in the income of A’s capital owners,
corporate tax revenue, and the welfare of the rest of society.
What is country A’s valuation of the plant? In other words, what is the maximum that
A is willing to pay to attract local production? Assuming that A behaves optimally, it will
post the smallest bid necessary to attract the investment away from country B. Therefore,
the MNE will be left essentially indifferent between locations. Consequently, (2) will hold,
which reduces (5) to
WAA −WAB = VA −BA, (6)
where
VA = SAA − SAB ≥ 0
denotes A’s valuation of the plant. Therefore, for any international distribution of ownership,
country A is willing to pay at most VA in subsidies to win the plant. Likewise, for any share
eB ∈ [0, 1− eA] of the firm owned in B, country B’s valuation is VB = SBB − SBA ≥ 0.
Therefore, whenever government A can attract the firm with a bid less than VA, it does so.
Otherwise, it sets BA = VA. This accounts for the kink in RA at BA = VA.5
It follows from our construction of the RA function that there exists a unique perfect
equilibrium along the 45-degree line in Figure 1 at point E. The identity of the winning
5 We assume that the countries never post weakly dominated bids, which rules out all BA > VA and
BB > VB. All BA > VA are weakly dominated by BA = VA. Pick any B0A > VA. Then for all BB < B
0
A + Γ,
country A’s welfare is strictly higher with BA = VA (either SAA−VA or SAB) than with BA = B0A (SAA−B0A).
For all BB > B0A + Γ, country A is indifferent between BA = VA, B0A.
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country depends on whether
VB − VA ≷ Γ (7)
In other words, the firm’s choice of investment location turns crucially upon whether B’s
valuation is sufficiently greater than A’s to overcome the latter’s geographic advantage. We
shall refer to VB − VA as the valuation premium that B places on the firm.
In the perfect equilibrium, illustrated at point E in Figure 1, country A wins the plant.
Country B offers a subsidy equal to its valuation, VB, and country A’s winning bid, B∗A, just
exceeds B’s subsidy less A’s geographic advantage:
B∗A = VB − Γ+ ε. (8)
Country A’s winning bid of (8) therefore leaves the firm almost indifferent between the two
production locations as post-tax profits are only infinitesimally higher if the firm locates in
A.
The following Proposition characterises our game’s perfect equilibrium:
Proposition: (i) If pre-tax profits are equal in the two countries, ΠA = ΠB, then the country
with the higher valuation wins the firm and pays a subsidy of just above the other
country’s valuation. (ii) If pre-tax profits are higher in A than in B, ΠA > ΠB, then
country B wins the plant if and only if its valuation premium exceeds the geographic
advantage offered by A.
When ΠA = ΠB, the tax/subsidy competition is a standard first-price auction. When
ΠA > ΠB, as shown in Figure 1, the magnitude of country A’s geographic advantage matters
for the equilibrium. If the countries’ bids are equal, then the firm will choose country A
because of its geographic advantage. Therefore, in order to win the bidding contest, country
A need not match B’s bid. Indeed, A can undercut B by the exact amount of its geographic
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advantage and still leave the firm indifferent between locations. (If Γ is sufficiently large,
the possibility emerges that the monopolist could be taxed by A in equilibrium.) Such a
recognition by the bidding countries of the importance of geographic advantages underlies
the result in part (ii).6
Because the countries’ maximum bids, VA and VB, are independent of national ownership
shares, it follows immediately that the countries’ best response functions RA and RB, and
consequently the equilibrium point E, are all independent of eA and eB. This establishes our
central result:
Invariance Result: The equilibrium plant location and tax/subsidy offers are independent
of the international distribution of firm ownership.
This Invariance Result is striking in its simplicity and is also very strong. Perhaps the
most remarkable implication is that the equilibrium with an arbitrary international distribu-
tion of ownership is identical to that under the special case of extra-regional firm ownership
(eA = eB = 0), which has been extensively analysed in the literature (e.g., Haufler and
Wooton, 1999).7 Thus the outcome of tax competition for a footloose production plant will
be the same, regardless of who owns the firm.
The intuition behind the Invariance Result runs as follows. When considering whether
to entice the firm away from its rival, a country has to determine at what point, as the
rival country posts higher bids, trumping the rival’s bid (that is, only just improving on the
6 It is worth briefly highlighting that there are obvious circumstances where one country would possess
both a valuation premium and a geographic advantage. For example, consider the case where the countries’
fixed/variable cost structures are identical but trade is costly and country A contains more identical households
than B. Here ΠA > ΠB due to A’s larger market. However, we would also expect VA > VB because
the aggregate benefits from inward FDI to both workers (e.g., wage premia) and indigenous firms (e.g.,
technological spillovers) will be greater in the larger market, where the MNE will employ more workers and
where (reasonably) there will be more indigenous firms to benefit from non-rivalrous spillovers. This is the
specific case illustrated in Figure 1.
7 To see this, substitute eA = 0 into (3) to give WAA = SAA − BA and WAB = SAB . In this case, A’s
reservation price is clearly VA.
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rival’s offer) is no longer worthwhile. As trumping leaves the firm with essentially identical
after-tax profits from producing in either location, a country’s capital owners are indifferent
to it. Therefore, any gain in welfare from local production must originate from the rest of
society and this remains the same whoever owns the firm.
At first glance the Invariance Result seems counter-intuitive. For example, assume that
ΠA > ΠB. In this case, a sensible prior would seem to be that increasing eA should increase
A’s valuation of the plant, because the income of capital owners in A would be highest
under local production in the more profitable location. This intuition is false because it links
capital income directly to pre-tax profits, ΠA and ΠB, whereas the owners of capital derive
income from the firm’s post-tax profits, Π∗A and Π
∗
B, which are endogenously determined
and equal across the two countries in equilibrium. The tax/subsidy competition equalises
post-tax profits across countries because the winning country never pays more for the plant
than it has to. This makes owners of capital indifferent to the location of production and
means that income from capital falls out of the countries’ welfare comparisons between local
and foreign production.8
We end this section by briefly discussing the key assumptions behind our Invariance
Result. Our social welfare function, Wij , is additively separable and linear in post-tax
capital income, social benefits, and tax/subsidy payments. In Appendix 1, we provide explicit
microfoundations for Wij , taking preferences and technology as primitives adopting a quasi-
linear and quadratic household utility function that is widely used in the related literature.
Additive separability is important for the Invariance Result because it allows us to cancel
the capital-income terms in (5). However, it is not strictly necessary for Wij to be linear
8 It might be thought that in the eA = 1 case, country A would be indifferent between all BA because
any subsidy payment is recycled entirely to domestic capital owners. However, this is false. If, for example,
BB were extremely large, then A would prefer to lose the contest as this outcome would yield huge overseas
profit income for its citizens.
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in its three arguments.9 The Invariance Result would continue to hold with, for example,
a diminishing marginal utility of capital income and an increasing marginal cost of public
funds. To incorporate these extensions, we would rewrite (3) as
Wij =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u(eiΠ∗j)− c(Bi) + Sij if i = j
u(eiΠ∗j) + Sij if i 6= j
(9)
where u0 (·) , c0 (·) > 0 and c00 (·) > 0 > u00 (·). In this case, it is straightforward to show that
country i would be prepared to pay at most c−1 (Vi) in subsidies for the plant. Moreover,
if c0 (0) = 1, such that the marginal cost of public funds progressively rises from unity, then
country i’s reservation price is strictly less than Vi.
Another prominent assumption is that of monopoly. In practice, firms tend to face rivals
on the product market. Our model could easily be extended to oligopoly by assuming that
tax/subsidy-setting discriminates between rival firms and that we are analysing the contest
for a single firm’s plant within an oligopolistic industry. In such a case, the profit income
from rival firms in the same industry would flow into our Sij terms. Our Invariance Result
would then state that the equilibrium of the bidding contest for any given firm is independent
of that particular firm’s ownership distribution.
4 Conclusion
The key contribution of this paper is our Invariance Result, which states that the equilibrium
of the tax/subsidy competition between two countries for a monopoly firm’s plant is, in all
respects, independent of how the firm’s ownership is distributed internationally.
We close by pointing out two implications of our Invariance Result. The first concerns its
relation to debates on the informational requirements for optimal policy choices. If a coun-
9 Nor, in the case where W is linear, do we need the weights on its three arguments to be equal. For
example, our results would be unaffected if the governments placed a greater weight on profit income than on
other components of social welfare.
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try’s reservation price for a plant is independent of how the firm’s ownership is distributed
internationally, then it follows directly that a country does not need to know the international
distribution of ownership to work out its reservation price. Therefore, our Invariance Result
shows that optimal behaviour in tax/subsidy competition is possible without any knowledge
of how firm ownership is distributed—information that is generally very hard to obtain. A
further policy implication is that the recent concern, expressed by both the OECD (1998)
and the EU (European Commission, 1998), that foreign firms tend to receive preferential tax
treatment because they are foreign may be misplaced.
Secondly, our Invariance Result suggests that tax/subsidy competition for its plants
should not play a role in explaining the international distribution of a firm’s ownership,
which our analysis takes as exogenous. For example, if firm owners gained much more
from tax/subsidy competition under some international ownership distributions than others,
then one could reasonably expect the “best” distributions to tend to arise in capital market
equilibrium. However, our Invariance Result renders such a selection between ownership
distributions impossible.
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5 Appendix 1: Derivation of the Social Welfare Function, Wij
In this appendix, we provide explicit microfoundations for the social welfare function, Wij ,
that we use in the main text and for the interpretation of Sij as a measure of consumer
surplus. The host-country economies, A and B, have the following familiar structure (also
used, for example, by Haufler and Wooton, 1999; and Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005,
amongst many others). Both countries contain two sectors: X, the industry under analysis,
and Y , which produces a numeraire good using only labour under perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. Therefore, the real wage equals labour productivity in Y , y. Total
post-tax household income in country i equals y−Bi+eiΠ∗j , where the firm chooses location
j and Bi represents lump-sum taxes (this expression normalises the number of workers to 1).
The household maximizes the quasi-linear quadratic utility U = αX−0.5X2+Y subject
to the budget constraint y −Bi + eiΠ∗j ≥ pXX + Y , which binds in equilibrium because the
marginal utility of Y is 1. In consumer equilibrium (with sufficiently high post-tax income
so that Y > 0), X = α− pX and
U = 0.5 (α− pX)2 + y −Bi + eiΠ∗j ,
where the first term on the R.H.S. is consumer surplus in market X. The above expression
takes the form of the social welfare functionWij in the main text with Sij = 0.5 (α− pX)2+y
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as a measure of consumer surplus. (Of course, when changes in utility are considered, the
real wage y drops out, so changes in S are driven solely by changes in consumer surplus).
6 Appendix 2: Equilibrium with Withholding Taxes
Our main analysis assumed that corporate taxes/subsidies were applied to the firm’s total
operating profits at source, following which profit income was distributed to the firm’s owners
without further taxation (either in the host country or in the owners’ home countries).
However, in reality, countries sometimes impose withholding taxes on the outward profit
flows that accrue to foreign capital owners. In this appendix, we examine how the imposition
of withholding taxes affects our equilibrium.
Assume that both countries apply proportional withholding taxes to outward flows of
profit income to the firm’s foreign owners. Denote the withholding tax rates by tA and tB,
and assume that they are set for the whole economy and so are exogenous to our partial
equilibrium analysis.
We get revised expressions for social welfare in country A:
WAA = eAΠ∗A + SAA −BA + tA (1− eA)Π∗A
WAB = eA (1− tB)Π∗B + SAB
We can now derive country A’s valuation of the firm in the presence of withholding taxes.
Country A prefers winning the firm if and only if WAA ≥WAB, i.e. iff
eAΠ∗A + SAA −BA + tA (1− eA)Π∗A ≥ eA (1− tB)Π∗B + SAB,
which can be rearranged to give
SAA − SAB + eA (1− tA)Π∗A + tAΠ∗A − eA (1− tB)Π∗B ≥ BA (10)
The question now arises: What measures of profit income does the tax/subsidy competition
between countries A and B equalise? The fact that, in the absence of withholding taxes,
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tax/subsidy competition equalises the firm’s post-tax profits across the two countries — to
make the firm’s owners indifferent between locations — is the key to our Invariance Result in
the main text. However, with withholding taxes, the plant-location preferences of the firm’s
owners will differ depending on where they live — i.e., for given tax/subsidy levels, there will
not typically be unanimity amongst the firm’s owners about the optimal plant location. This
consideration clearly complicates the analysis of equilibrium under withholding taxes. For
simplicity, we introduce the notion of a decisive set of owners: a subset of the firm’s owners
is decisive if they can collectively determine the firm’s choices. Moreover, for brevity, we
restrict attention to the three cases where the firm has a decisive group of owners in one of
{A,B,RoW} since, in these three cases, the firm’s responses to given values of the policy
parameters are clear.
If owners in RoW are decisive, then the firm will locate its plant in the country that offers
the higher level of post-withholding-tax profits, (1− tj)Π∗j . Therefore, the industry-specific
policy variables BA and BB will optimally be set so that (1− tA)Π∗A = (1− tB)Π∗B, and
condition (10) becomes
SAA − SAB + tAΠ∗A ≥ BA
The LHS of this condition gives A’s valuation of the firm, and it is independent of the
national ownership shares, eA and eB. Therefore, if owners in RoW are decisive, then our
Invariance Result continues to hold in the presence of withholding taxes — in the sense that
equilibrium choices are independent of the international distribution of the firm’s ownership.
(Note, however, that because country A retains withholding tax revenue when it hosts the
plant, its valuation of the plant rises in the presence of withholding taxes.)
If owners in A are decisive, then the tax/subsidy competition will make them indifferent
between the two locations and set eAΠ∗A = eA (1− tB)Π∗B. Using this equality to simplify
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(10), it is straightforward to show that A’s valuation of the plant then depends negatively
on eA because A’s withholding tax revenue falls as eA rises. If owners in B are decisive so
eBΠ∗B = eB (1− tA)Π∗A in equilibrium, then no immediate simplification of (10) is possible.
Therefore, with decisive owners in either A or B, the countries’ valuations, and hence also
the equilibrium, typically depend on the national ownership shares.
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